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Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of  
Their Tax-Exempt Status 
Timothy J. Tracey*
INTRODUCTION
“It is . . . it is going to be an issue.”1 With those words, the Solicitor 
General of the United States, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., announced that 
religious liberty is directly threatened by the legalization of same-sex 
marriage. General Verrilli represented the Obama Administration at the oral 
argument in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the case concerning whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry. 
He made the statement in response to a question from Justice Samuel Alito. 
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in the Bob Jones case, the Court held that a 
college was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial 
marriage or interracial dating. So would the same apply to a university 
or a college if it opposed same-sex marriage? 
GENERAL VERRILLI: You know, I . . . I don’t think I can answer 
that question without knowing more specifics, but it’s certainly going 
to be an issue. I . . . I don’t deny that. I don’t deny that, Justice Alito. It 
is . . . it is going to be an issue.3
In Bob Jones University v. United States,4 the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could revoke the tax-
exempt status of two private, religious schools—Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, Inc. and Bob Jones University—because their admission policies 
were “contrary to a fundamental public policy.”5 Goldsboro flatly denied 
admission to black students, while Bob Jones admitted black students but 
prohibited interracial dating.6 Both schools genuinely believed that the 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. My thanks to Tricia, Nathan, and Noah 
for their love, support, and encouragement. SDG. 
1  Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 
14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
2  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015). 
3  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38. 
4  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
5 Id. at 592–93. 
6 See id. at 580, 583. 
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Bible prohibited racial intermixing.7
The schools argued that, as religious institutions whose discrimination 
was religiously required, they should be exempt from the IRS policy of 
conditioning tax-exempt status for educational institutions on compliance 
with anti-discrimination norms. The Court rejected the argument that the 
denial violated the schools’ free exercise rights. The Court ruled that 
eradicating race discrimination was an interest “so compelling as to allow 
even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct.”8 The Court 
acknowledged that the “[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a 
substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools,” but “[t]hat 
[the] governmental interest [in eliminating discrimination] substantially 
outweigh[ed] whatever burden denial of tax benefits place[d] on petitioners’ 
exercise of their religious beliefs.”9
If opposition to same-sex marriage is also “contrary to a fundamental 
public policy,” then what happens to the private, religious schools that 
prohibit same-sex dating or deny housing to students in same-sex 
relationships? After all, opposition to same-sex marriage, according to the 
Obergefell majority, “disparage[s] [same-sex couples’] choices,”10
“diminish[es] their personhood,”11 and “demeans or stigmatizes”12 them. 
Surely, that too runs “contrary to fundamental public policy?”13
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy did little to answer that 
concern.
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to 
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere 
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be 
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations 
and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the 
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, 
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they 
have long revered.14
True, it is a nod and a smile in the direction of the First Amendment. But it 
is little more. The promise that people of faith may “advocate” and “teach” 
their beliefs about marriage gives scant assurance that they can in fact act
7 Id. at 602 n.28; see also id. at 604 n.30. 
8 Id. at 603. 
9 Id. at 603–04. 
10 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592–93. 
14 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
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on those beliefs. A church can teach that marriage is between one man and 
one woman but can the church refuse to perform a same-sex marriage? A 
Christian college can advocate for the complementary roles of husbands and 
wives in marriage but can they establish rules prohibiting same-sex 
relationships? The dissenting Justices harped on this anemic view of 
religious liberty posited by the majority. Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
The majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue 
to “advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. The First 
Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion. 
Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.  
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways 
that may be seen to conflict with the new to same-sex marriage—
when, for example, a religious college provides married student 
housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption 
agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples . . . 
Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment 
they receive from the majority today.15
Justice Thomas expressed similar concerns: 
In our society, marriage is not simply a governmental institution; it is a 
religious institution as well. Today’s decision might change the 
former, but it cannot change the latter. It appears all but inevitable that 
the two will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and 
churches are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse 
civil marriages between same-sex couples. 
The majority appears unmoved by that inevitability. It makes only a 
weak gesture toward religious liberty in a single paragraph. And even 
that gesture indicates a misunderstanding of religious liberty in our 
Nation’s tradition. Religious liberty is about more than just the 
protection for “religious organizations and persons . . . as they seek to 
teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives 
and faiths.” Religious liberty is about freedom of action in matters of 
religion generally, and the scope of that liberty is directly correlated to 
the civil restraints placed upon religious practice. 
Although our Constitution provides some protection against such 
governmental restrictions on religious practices, the People have long 
elected to afford broader protections than this Court’s constitutional 
precedents mandate. Had the majority allowed the definition of 
marriage to be left to the political process—as the Constitution 
15 Id. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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requires—the People could have considered the religious liberty 
implications of deviating from the traditional definition as part of their 
deliberative process. Instead, the majority’s decision short-circuits that 
process, with potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty.16
Justice Alito said similarly: 
Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority 
attempts, toward the end of its opinion, to reassure those who oppose 
same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected. We 
will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume that those who 
cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the 
recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they 
will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, 
employers, and schools.17
As if on cue, only two days after the Court handed down Obergefell,
Mark Oppenheimer, a news columnist, took to the Time magazine blog to 
call for the IRS to strip religious organizations of their tax-exempt status. 
Invoking Bob Jones, he said, “It’s time to abolish, or greatly diminish, their 
tax-exempt statuses.” He concluded, “So yes, the logic of gay-marriage 
rights could lead to a reexamination of conservative churches’ tax 
exemptions . . . . But when that day comes, it will be long overdue.”18
Oppenheimer knows the consequences of shucking religious 
organizations of their tax-exempt status would be disastrous. He conceded 
that “charitable giving would drop,” and that “churches would be squeezed 
out of high-property-value areas.”19 And the poor be damned—”we’d have 
fewer church soup kitchens.”20 Professor Denny Burk gave the grisly 
details:
When tax exemptions are removed, donors will give far less than they 
are giving now. Churches will become liable to property taxes. That 
means that many churches will have to forfeit their property to the 
government because they won’t be able to afford the taxes they have to 
pay on it. Many of them wouldn’t be able to pay them now. If 
donations went down, they would be that much further from being able 
to pay them. As a result, churches that reside on valuable properties in 
16 Id. at 2638–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
18  Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time to End Tax Exemptions for Religious Institutions, TIME
(June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institu
tions.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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urban locations would be immediately vulnerable. Eventually, so 
would everyone else. A call for ending tax exemptions for religious 
institutions is a call to close them down . . . .21
Oppenheimer is confused. He misunderstands the nature of tax 
exemptions for religious organizations. Throughout his blog post, he called 
for the government to stop “subsidizing” religion.22 But when the federal 
government exempts religious groups from paying federal income tax, it is 
not choosing to bankroll religion. Rather, the government is recognizing 
that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment mandates a 
separation of church and state. The Clause acts as a restraint on the federal 
government’s power over matters “respecting an establishment of 
religion.”23 It places these matters outside the purview of government 
power.24 The government refrains from taxation of religious organizations 
“to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and activities.”25 Tax 
exemption, said Professor Edward Zelinsky, is an “acknowledgement of 
sectarian sovereignty, . . . rather than the subsidization of religion.” “In the 
final analysis, tax exemption,” observed Zelinsky, “does not subsidize 
churches, but leaves them alone.”26
Every law student knows the one-liner from McCulloch v. Maryland27:
“the power to tax involves the power to destroy.”28 The U.S. Supreme Court 
held in McCulloch that the principle of federalism—the structural restraint 
imposed by the Constitution on the federal government’s power over the 
states and, vice-versa, the states’ power over the federal government—
prevented the State of Maryland from taxing the federal bank. Were it 
otherwise, the Court said, the state could tax the federal bank out of 
existence. That would invert the structure of the Constitution, which makes 
the federal government supreme over the states. Federalism—the very 
structure of government enshrined in the Constitution—placed the power to 
tax the instruments of the federal government outside the purview of the 
21  Denny Burk, Ending Tax Exemptions Means Ending Churches, THE FEDERALIST (June 29, 
2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/06/29/ending-tax-exemptions-means-ending-churches. 
22  Oppenheimer, supra note 18. 
23  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
24 See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (arguing that the Establishment Clause is “properly understood as a 
structural restraint on governmental power” and “its task is to negate from the purview of civil 
governance all matters ‘respecting an establishment of religion’”). 
25  Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent 
on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 807 (2001). 
26 Id.
27  17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
28 Id. at 431. 
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states.29
In the same way, the Establishment Clause places outside the purview 
of the federal government matters “respecting an establishment of 
religion,”30 including the power to tax religious organizations. Just as 
federalism recognizes the federal government and the states as distinct 
sovereigns with separate spheres of power, the Establishment Clause 
recognizes the church and the civil government as separate and distinct 
sovereigns.31 Neither can encroach on the territory of the other. Were the 
federal government permitted to tax religious organizations, it could snuff 
religion out. 
The IRS’s own regulations recognize this limitation. Churches “are 
automatically considered tax exempt and are not required to apply for and 
obtain recognition of tax-exempt status from the IRS.”32 The Constitution 
itself precludes the government from taxing churches. It is automatic. The 
reason religious organizations, other than churches, must apply for tax-
exempt status is to ensure that they are in fact religious. Once that 
determination is made, they too are exempt from federal income tax.33 The 
IRS is merely recognizing what the Constitution already mandates. 
The Bob Jones case represents the lone exception. Eradicating race 
discrimination is the only “fundamental public policy” the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held overrides the First Amendment mandate of separation of 
church and state. The IRS agrees. “Currently the sole basis for revocation of 
exemption on public policy grounds,” says the IRS, “is engaging in race 
discrimination.”34 The government’s interest in “eradicating racial 
discrimination in education” is, according to the Bob Jones court, “so 
compelling” as to warrant the breach of the wall of separation.35
Bob Jones, in this regard, is singular. It is a historical anomaly. “[The 
case],” said Professor Olatunde Johnson, “is too extraordinary to matter 
much.”36 Private, segregated schools had sprung up across the South as a 
29 See id. at 428–35. 
30  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31 See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption,
23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998) (conceptualizing exemption under Section 501(c)(3) as premised on the 
notion that charitable entities are “co-sovereigns” with the state). 
32  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2, 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
33 See id. at 3. 
34  Internal Revenue Service, Field Service Advice Memorandum, 1997 FSA LEXIS 478, at *11 
(Apr. 23, 1997). 
35  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983). 
36  Olati Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, and 
Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence 29 (Colum. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 
9184, 2010), http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/9184. 
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way to dodge integrated public education. States were fostering the 
expansion of these schools, according to Johnson, by “enacting legislation 
mandating or allowing the closing of public schools to resist desegregation 
or providing state tax credits and tuition grants to students attending private 
schools.”37 Denying tax-exempt status was the only way to curb the growth 
of these schools. Moreover, “the position of all three branches of the 
Federal Government was unmistakably clear”—racial discrimination in 
education “violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary 
justice.”38
Bob Jones, thus, sits alongside the myriad of other court decisions 
from the civil rights era where the Supreme Court was willing to go to 
extraordinary lengths to eradicate race discrimination. Cases, like Norwood
v. Harrison,39 where the Court deviated from the norm to get at the horrible 
evil that is race discrimination. In Norwood, the Court held that the racial 
discrimination of private schools in Mississippi could be attributed to the 
state, because the state provided the schools with free textbooks.40 Yet the 
general rule is, even if the state is providing 99 percent of the funding for a 
private organization and heavily regulating almost every aspect of its 
operation, the private organization is nonetheless not a state actor.41 The 
Court was willing to set aside this general rule to go after racism. The Court 
did not vitiate the rule. Instead, it found that the extraordinary 
circumstances—the long history of slavery, racism, and discrimination 
against African-Americans—warranted setting the rule aside in this one 
instance.
Professor Michael Paulsen put it this way: 
Bob Jones strikes me as sui generis—a just result that seemingly had to 
be reached because of our national commitment to racial equality and 
our shameful national history of slavery and segregation, but that 
ought not to have been reached at such expense to constitutional 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592, 598. 
39  413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
40 Id. at 467 (“[T]he constitutional infirmity of the Mississippi textbook program is that it 
significantly aids the organization and continuation of a separate system of private schools which, under 
the District Court holding, may discriminate if they so desire.”). 
41 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982) (“In recent years, public funds have 
accounted for at least 90%, and in one year 99%, of respondent school’s operating budget.”); see also id.
at 840 (“[W]e conclude that the school’s receipt of public funds does not make the discharge decisions 
acts of the State.”); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (“That programs undertaken by the 
State result in substantial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the fact 
of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsible for decisions made by the 
entity in the course of its business.”). 
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principle—and should be treated as such. It should not be permitted to 
generate consequences much beyond the facts of the particular case.42
Hence, Bob Jones cannot be generalized into a rule that the IRS can 
deny religious organizations tax-exempt status anytime something smells 
mildly of discrimination. Even the panoply of court decisions, legislation, 
and public policy pronouncements concerning gender discrimination have 
not added up to a “fundamental public policy” sufficient to deny religious 
organizations tax-exempt status. Churches and other religious organizations 
routinely discriminate on the basis of gender when it comes to ministers, 
priests, pastors, and the like. Yet they retain their tax-exempt status. 
Prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination similarly cannot be called 
a “fundamental public policy” that warrants overriding the constitutional 
mandate of separation of church and state. At least not yet. Unlike the 
history that gave rise to Bob Jones, thousands of private schools did not 
spring up as a means to avoid attending school with gays and lesbians. In 
fact, many private schools actively recruit gay men and lesbians.43
Nor have “all three branches of the Federal Government” been 
“unmistakably clear” in condemning sexual orientation discrimination.44
Executive orders signed by Presidents Clinton and Obama prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination by the federal government and its contractors.45
But federal law otherwise does not prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination. Congress has repeatedly declined to pass the Employment 
42  Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: 
Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 653, 694 (1996). 
43 See John Schwartz, Finding a Gay-Friendly Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), www.
nytimes.com/2010/04/18/education/edlife/18guidance-t.html?_r=0; Matt Lamb, Penn’s Gaydar Ad-
missions Project Goes Back Years: Gays are “Blue-Chip Recruits”, THE COLLEGE FIX (Nov. 20, 2014), 
www.thecollegefix.com/post/20203/; Scott Jaschik, The Same Boxes to Check, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 
26, 2011), www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/26/common_application_rejects_new_questions_on
_sexual_orientation_and_gender_identity; Doree Shafrir, The Ivy League’s Big Gay Admission, DETAILS
(Sept. 23, 2010), www.details.com/culture-trends/news-and-politics/201009/gay-lgbt-sexual-orientation-
ivy-league-admission.
44 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983). 
45 See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 2, 1995) (establishing criteria for the 
issuance of security clearances including sexual orientation for the first time in its non-discrimination 
language: “The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information.” It also 
said that “no inference” about suitability for access to classified information “may be raised solely on 
the basis of the sexual orientation of the employee.”); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30097 (May 
28, 1998) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the competitive service of the 
federal civilian workforce); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 14) (adding “gender 
identity” to the categories protected against discrimination in hiring in the federal civilian workforce and 
both “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the categories protected against discrimination in 
hiring and employment on the part of federal government contractors and sub-contractors). 
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Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would ban discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in employment nationwide. ENDA has been 
introduced in every Congress since 1994, but has yet to pass both houses.46
The version of ENDA that passed the Senate in November 2013 contained a 
broad religious exemption. Referring directly to the religious exemption in 
Title VII, it exempted from the prohibition on employment discrimination 
based on sexual orientation the same class of religious organizations that 
are exempt from the existing prohibition on religious discrimination in 
employment.47 The Supreme Court in Obergefell held that the fundamental 
right to marry protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of 
same-sex couples to marry. But the Court did not hold that sexual 
orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.48 Federal law, thus, at least as 
it currently sits, provides no basis for concluding that a “fundamental public 
policy” of prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination exists.49
That of course could change. In mid-July of 2015, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interpreted Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act to forbid sexual orientation discrimination on the job 
as a form of “sex” discrimination.50 The EEOC’s views on the scope of the 
Title VII are merely persuasive, not binding, authority on the courts. But if 
the EEOC’s ruling sticks, it will accomplish what Congress could not: 
establish a national policy of protecting gay men and lesbians from job 
discrimination. Even if that happens, it would still be difficult to argue “all 
three branches of the Federal Government” have been “unmistakably 
clear”51 in condemning sexual orientation discrimination. Congress will 
have remained silent. But it would indicate a clear move toward a national 
policy against sexual orientation discrimination. Perhaps four to five years 
from now, the calculus under Bob Jones will come out differently. 
46 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employ 
ment_Non-Discrimination_Act#113th_Congress (last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
47 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013), www.
congress.gov/113/bills/s815/BILLS-113s815rfh.pdf.
48 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–05 (2015). 
49   Although not directly relevant under Bob Jones, state law tells much the same story. Twenty-
one states and the District of Columbia have passed laws prohibiting sexual orientation in employment 
in the public and private sectors. All of these laws contain religious exemptions. See JEROME HUNT, A
STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS ACTION FUND 3–4 (2012), www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/report/2012/06/11/11696/
a-state-by-state-examination-of-nondiscrimination-laws-and-policies.
50 See Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 16, 2015), www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/sexual_orientation/eeoc-lgbt-title-vii-decision.authch
eckdam.pdf.
51 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983). 
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This Article argues that the income tax exemptions provided to 
religious institutions are constitutionally mandated and that whatever 
interest the government has in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination 
does not justify setting this mandate aside. Part I defines what is meant by 
“tax-exempt status.” Part II shows that the religious exemption from the 
federal income tax is constitutionally required. The exemption is compelled 
by the structure of the U.S. Constitution, rather than a matter of government 
altruism. Part III lays out the extraordinary character of the Bob Jones case
and its limited application beyond the eradication of race discrimination at 
educational institutions. Part IV argues that Bob Jones cannot be used to 
justify stripping religious institutions of their federal tax-exempt status. 
This Article concludes that the religious exemption from the income tax is 
about obeying the constitutional command to leave religious institutions 
alone and nothing in Bob Jones and Obergefell gives cause to do otherwise. 
I. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY “TAX-EXEMPT STATUS”?
The Bob Jones court considered only whether the federal government, 
vis-à-vis the IRS, could deny private religious schools exemptions from 
federal income taxes, not exemptions from the slew of other taxes imposed 
on private religious schools, like payroll taxes. That is because the tax-
exempt designations doled out by the IRS spare a religious school from 
paying federal corporate income tax and nothing else. The IRS has no 
authority to exempt religious schools from other taxes. 
Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a list of 29 
nonprofit organizations that are exempt from federal income tax.52 The most 
common type of tax-exempt organization falls under the category 501(c)(3), 
which exempts organizations established for a variety of charitable 
purposes, including religious and educational purposes.53
To qualify for tax-exempt status, an organization must meet the 
following requirements: 
•? the organization must be organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, educational, scientific, or other 
52  People often confuse the terms “nonprofit” and “tax exempt.” Just because an organization is 
a nonprofit corporation does not make it tax exempt. Nonprofit status refers to incorporation status under 
state law; tax-exempt status refers to federal income tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code. 
Nonprofit corporations, contrary to what the name suggests, can earn a profit, meaning they can generate 
more income than expenses. What they cannot do is distribute these earnings to individuals who control 
the organizations. They have no shareholders. Nonprofits exist to benefit the public good, not private 
investors. All profits must be reinvested into the nonprofit to further the purposes for which they were 
organized. Although many nonprofit corporations are also tax exempt, they are not automatically so. 
The nonprofit corporation must meet certain criteria and, generally, apply to the IRS. 
53 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2015). 
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charitable purposes, 
•? net earnings may not inure to the benefit of any private 
individual or shareholder, 
•? no substantial part of its activity may be attempting to 
influence legislation, 
•? the organization may not intervene in political campaigns, 
and
•? the organization’s purposes and activities may not be illegal 
or violate fundamental public policy.54
Private religious schools ordinarily satisfy these requirements. They 
are organized for religious and educational purposes, two of the permissible 
purposes spelled out in Section 501(c)(3). The schools are organized as 
nonprofit corporations, meaning they do not distribute earnings to investors 
or other private individuals. Rather, they reinvest their earnings into the 
school to further their religious and educational missions. The schools 
refrain from political activity, either lobbying or campaigning. And their 
purposes and activities are not illegal. The open question, of course, is 
whether their purposes and activities violate “fundamental public policy.” 
But given that eradicating race discrimination in education is, thus far, the 
only public policy ground the IRS or the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized as sufficient to deny tax-exempt status, the bulk of private 
religious schools seem to be in compliance. 
Private schools gain two perks from tax-exempt status. First, the tax 
exemption frees them from paying federal corporate income tax on their 
earnings.55 The caveat is that the income must be related to their religious 
and educational missions. Unrelated business income is still subject to 
taxation.56 Consider an example. A private Christian college opens a pizza 
parlor on campus to sell pizza to students and non-students alike. The 
college is a tax-exempt organization and its pizza parlor generates unrelated 
business income. While the tuition and fees generated by the college are tax 
exempt, its income from the pizza parlor is not. The pizza parlor is 
unrelated to the college’s educational and religious purposes. 
Second, tax-exempt status means contributions to private religious 
schools are tax deductible.57 Donors may deduct the amount donated to a 
private religious school from their taxable income and lower their tax bill. 
Obviously, that makes giving to private religious schools, or any other tax-
54 See id. § 501(c)(3); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES &
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2015), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf. 
55 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2015). 
56 See id. § 501(b). 
57 See id. § 170. 
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exempt charity for that matter, more appealing than it would otherwise be. 
But 501(c)(3) status does not give private schools a free ride. The 
schools are still on the hook for payroll and withholding taxes, 
unemployment taxes, property taxes, state and local income taxes, and sales 
tax. Moreover, as explained above, any income unrelated to the religious 
and/or educational purpose of the schools remains subject to federal income 
tax. Of course, state law could separately exempt religious schools from 
state and local taxes. But that is purely a function of state law and not the 
tax-exempt designation from the IRS. 
II. THE RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION FROM THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED 
BY THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The governing case law, the history, and the underlying policy 
considerations, all favor the conclusion that the exemption of religious 
organizations from the federal income tax is compelled by the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
A.  Is Tax-Exempt Status a Government Subsidy? 
Despite the heated rhetoric surrounding Obergefell, whether private 
religious schools opposing same-sex marriage may retain their tax-exempt 
status largely turns on a prosaic issue: is tax-exempt status of religious 
organizations a government subsidy or a constitutionally-mandated 
accommodation of religious exercise? If it is a subsidy, then tax exemption 
is a matter of government largess. Religious organizations have no right to 
an exemption. The government can choose to exempt private religious 
schools or not. But if tax-exempt status for religious organizations is 
commanded by the constitution, then the federal government has no choice 
in the matter. It must exempt religious organizations from federal income 
taxes. It cannot override that constitutional command absent the most 
extraordinary circumstances. 
At first blush, the question seems daft. Of course, tax exemptions are 
subsidies. A subsidy is any “pecuniary aid furnished by a government to a 
private industrial undertaking, a charity organization, or the like.”58 When 
the IRS exempts religious organizations from paying income tax, it 
undeniably provides them with “pecuniary aid.” Less tax paid, means more 
money in the coffers. Obviously, right? 
58 Subsidy, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/subsidy (last visited Sept. 
9, 2015). 
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But that oversimplifies the matter. When used by the Supreme Court, 
the word “subsidy” is a term of art. The Court is not using the word 
according to its plain meaning. Otherwise, any time the government handed 
out money to a private entity, it could be dubbed a “subsidy.” Rather, the 
Court uses the term to describe those particular instances where the 
government furnishes money to private entities to promote the 
government’s own policies.59 In these instances, the government may take 
steps to ensure that the entities receiving subsidies fulfill the government’s 
own policy objectives. And the government has no obligation, 
constitutional or otherwise, to subsidize entities that cannot or will not 
promote its policies.60
Suppose the University of Virginia (UVA), a public university, gives 
money to the organization Courage to Care to have Dr. Carolyn Cornelison 
address students about responsible drinking.61 UVA has an “Alcohol and 
Drug Policy” that provides, “The University . . . does not condone the 
illegal or otherwise irresponsible use of alcohol and other drugs.”62 When 
UVA gives money to Courage to Care, it is doing so to promote its own 
policy concerning alcohol abuse. UVA is paying Dr. Cornelison to convey 
the university’s own message. That money is properly termed a government 
subsidy. It is UVA furnishing money to a private entity to further its own 
policies.
Because the money is a subsidy, UVA has “latitude . . . for restrictions 
on speech.”63 The university “may take legitimate and appropriate steps to 
ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee” 
without running afoul of the Constitution.64 It can tell Dr. Cornelison that 
she must speak about responsible drinking. It can prohibit her from using 
the money to stand up and talk about some other topic, like the academic 
challenges of getting a PhD, without violating Dr. Cornelison’s free speech 
rights. The Court put it this way: “[W]e have permitted the government to 
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed . . . when it enlists private 
entities to convey its own message.”65
59 See Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–42 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 
529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000). 
60 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; Southworth, 519 U.S. at 235. 
61 See COURAGE TO CARE, www.ccspeaks.com (last visited Sept. 9 2015). 
62 ALCOHOL AND DRUG POLICY, UNIV. OF VA. GRADUATE REC. ch. 4 (1998), www.virginia.edu/
registrar/records/98gradrec/chapter4/gchap4-2.3.html.
63 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541. 
64 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
65 Id.
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Moreover, UVA can subsidize speech about responsible drinking 
without needing to fund speech promoting the opposite viewpoint—speech 
extolling the “virtues” of frat parties. “[V]iewpoint-based funding 
decisions,” said the Court, “can be sustained in instances . . . in which the 
government used private speakers to transmit specific information 
pertaining to its own program.”66 While such viewpoint is ordinarily an 
“egregious”67 First Amendment violation, it is perfectly acceptable when 
the government is doling out subsidies. 
Rust v. Sullivan68 provides an example of a government subsidy 
straight from the Court’s jurisprudence. In Rust, the federal government had 
a policy of supporting “preventive family planning services, population 
research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and 
educational activities.”69 To further this policy, Congress passed Title X of 
the Public Health Services Act to give money to doctors to advise patients 
about family planning. Congress did not consider abortion to be within its 
family planning objectives, so it forbade doctors receiving money from 
discussing abortion with their patients.70 Some doctors receiving Title X 
money challenged this restriction as violating their free speech rights. 
Specifically, they “contend[ed] that the regulations violate[d] the First 
Amendment by impermissibly discriminating based on viewpoint because 
they prohibit all discussion about abortion as a lawful option . . . while 
compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes 
continuing a pregnancy to term.”71
The Supreme Court ruled that the Title X grants were government 
subsidies. Congress gave money to doctors for the purpose of promoting the 
government’s own policies about family planning. As such, Congress could 
impose restrictions to ensure that the doctors were in fact furthering the 
government’s policy objectives, even if that meant engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination. The Court said: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the 
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative 
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so 
doing, the Government has . . . merely chosen to fund one activity to 
the exclusion of the other. A legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
66 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (citations and quotations omitted). 
67 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
68  500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
69 Id. at 178–81. 
70 See id. at 178. 
71 Id. at 192 (quotations omitted). 
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exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right . . . . There 
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected 
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant 
with legislative policy.72
The prohibition on abortion counseling was necessary “to ensure that the 
limits of the federal program [were] observed.”73
So if tax exemptions for religious organizations are subsidies—true 
subsidies in the technical, legal sense—then the IRS has the leeway to 
impose restrictions to ensure that the organizations advance the 
government’s reasons for handing out the exemptions in the first place. 
According to this line of argument, the reason the government provides tax 
exemptions to charities, including religious organizations, is a recognition 
of the public benefit these organizations provide.74 Religious organizations 
that espouse the belief that marriage is only between one man and one 
woman cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit and, therefore, the 
IRS can deny them a tax exemption. To exempt such bigoted organizations 
would run contrary to the government’s policies undergirding tax 
exemptions. Therefore, the government can choose not to exempt them 
without raising any concerns under the Constitution. It is like UVA funding 
a speech by Dr. Cornelison but not the frat boy. Or Congress funding 
doctors promoting childbirth but not doctors promoting abortion. They are 
matters of government discretion and policymaking, and not matters of any 
constitutional magnitude. 
But if the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment—the principle 
of separation of church and state—mandates tax exemptions for religious 
organizations, then the IRS has no discretion in the matter. The exemptions 
are not about a determination of whether particular religious organizations 
provide what the government believes is a “public benefit.” Or even a 
government decision as to whether specific religious organizations further 
the IRS’s policies behind the giving of tax exemptions. Rather, the 
government is obeying a constitutional command, in which case, a tax 
exemption for religious organizations cannot be denominated a subsidy. 
The government is adhering to the very structure of government dictated by 
the Constitution, not choosing which organizations best furthers its own 
agenda.
72 Id. at 193. 
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“Charitable exemptions 
are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or 
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work 
of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.”). 
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B.  The Establishment Clause Forbids the Government from Intruding on 
the Autonomy of Religious Organizations 
The common understanding of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment—or the separation of church and state—is that it prevents the 
government from doing religious “stuff.” The person on the street accepts 
that the Establishment Clause means the government cannot set up a 
Methodist church, force public school students to worship Vishnu, or send 
tax dollars to the local mosque. But what is missing is an understanding of 
the flipside of separation of church and state. The Establishment Clause 
also means the government cannot monkey around with the autonomy of 
religious institutions. The Supreme Court put it this way: “[The 
Establishment Clause] radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in 
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters 
of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”75
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Pres-
byterian Church,76 for example, presented the Supreme Court with a dispute 
between a Presbyterian denomination, and two of its local congregations 
over the control of properties in Georgia. The controversy began when the 
local churches sought to leave the denomination and take their property 
with them. The churches believed that the denomination’s apparent 
abandonment of traditional, orthodox Christian beliefs justified leaving with 
their property.77 The lower court held in favor of the local churches, finding 
75  Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). The Watson Court clearly premised its holding in 
terms of lack of jurisdiction or power: 
But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical 
in its character,––a matter over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction,––a matter which 
concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity 
of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them,–becomes the subject of 
its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the 
particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that 
the laws of the church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a sense 
often used in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see 
that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal 
theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every 
religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would 
become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would 
be determined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of 
construing their own church laws . . . and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where 
property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions. 
Id. at 733–34. 
76 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
77 See id. at 441–43. 
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that the denomination had in fact left behind orthodox beliefs and thereby 
given up any right to the contested property.78
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause 
precluded the courts from becoming involved in the dispute, since it 
necessarily turned on a determination of what constituted orthodox 
Christian beliefs. The “American concept of the relationship between 
church and state . . . leaves the civil courts no role in determining 
ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.”79 “If 
civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies in order to 
adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting 
the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular 
interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.”80 The separation of 
church and state mandated by the Establish-ment Clause prevented the 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over the religious dispute. 
The Court has regularly extended this same protection to the autonomy 
of private religious schools. For example, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago,81 teachers at two Catholic high schools filed petitions with the 
National Labor Relations Board accusing the schools of unfair labor 
practices. The schools moved to dismiss the petitions claiming that the 
Establishment Clause precluded the Board from asserting jurisdiction. The 
Court agreed, holding that “the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment foreclosed the Board’s jurisdiction.”82 The Court reasoned: 
The resolution of [the unfair labor] charges by the Board, in many 
instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the 
position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to 
the school’s religious mission. It is not only the conclusions that may 
be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by 
the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to 
findings and conclusions . . . . Inevitably the Board’s inquiry will 
implicate sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts between 
clergy-administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators for 
unions.83
The Establishment Clause required the Court to interpret the Act to avoid “a 
significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.”84 The Court 
78 See id. at 443–44. 
79 Id. at 445–47. 
80 Id. at 449. 
81  440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
82 Id. at 496. 
83 Id. at 502–03. 
84 Id. at 502. 
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said, “[W]e decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call 
upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the 
guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.”85
Most recently, the Court unanimously held that the Establishment 
Clause barred it from considering a claim brought under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) by a former employee against a private 
Lutheran elementary school.86 Cheryl Perich worked at the school teaching 
a variety of subjects, including math, language arts, social studies, science, 
gym, art, music, and religion. She became ill with narcolepsy and could no 
longer teach. The school placed Perich on disability and then eventually 
asked her to resign when it appeared she “was unlikely to be physically 
capable of returning to work.”87 Perich became upset and refused to resign. 
Instead of resolving the dispute peaceably, Perich threatened to sue under 
the ADA. The school subsequently fired her because “her threat to sue the 
[school] violated the Synod’s belief that Christians should resolve their 
disputes internally.”88 Perich subsequently made good on her threat and 
sued the school under the ADA. 
The Court refused to hear Perich’s claim. “[T]he First Amendment 
requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her 
religious employer.”89 Applying the ADA to the school, said the Court, 
“intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.”90 The First 
Amendment “protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission through its appointments.”91 For the Court to second guess the 
school’s decisions in this case would trench on that right. Separation of 
church and state, said the Court, “bars such a suit.”92
Thus, the Establishment Clause not only forecloses the government 
from affirmatively supporting religion, but, more pertinently, shuts the 
government out of religious matters. The government cannot tread into the 
realm reserved for religion. It is precisely this concern that is raised by the 
threat of stripping religious schools of their tax-exempt status.93
85 Id. at 507. 
86 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701 
(2012).
87 Id. at 700. 
88 Id. at 701. 
89 Id. at 709. 
90 Id. at 706. 
91 Id.
92 Id. at 710. 
93  Hypothetically, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-4 (2015), bolsters a religious organization’s claim for an exemption from the federal income tax. 
However, Bob Jones is a part of the body of religious liberty law that predates Employment Division v. 
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C.  The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Religious Tax Exemptions 
A review of the relevant Supreme Court cases shows that the Court’s 
treatment of religious tax exemptions has been, at best, erratic. But one 
constant runs through all the cases. The Court has always tied the 
constitutionality of religious tax exemptions to concerns about separation of 
church and state. That constancy suggests that such exemptions are an 
acknowledgement of the autonomy of religious organizations rather than a 
subsidy of religion. 
1.  A Survey of the Relevant Supreme Court Cases 
A review of the pertinent cases starts with Murdock v. Pennsylvania94
and Follett v. Town of McCormick.95 The most interesting feature of 
Murdock and Follett is that the tax exemptions in those cases were created 
by the Court itself, based on an understanding of the imperatives of the First 
Amendment. The Court recognized the exemptions as being constitutionally 
compelled rather than being within the discretion of the legislature. 
Both Murdock and Follett involved municipal ordinances imposing a 
licensing tax on persons selling goods and merchandise in the community. 
In both cases, the cities taxed the Jehovah’s Witnesses for going “door to 
door . . . distributing literature and soliciting people to purchase certain 
religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible & 
Tract Society.”96
The Murdock Court held that the First Amendment required an 
exemption for the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ canvassing activities. Echoing the 
language of McCulloch v. Maryland,97 the Court said that allowing the City 
of Jeannette to tax religious exercise would have a “destructive effect.”98
“The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms,” said 
the Court, “is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court 
has repeatedly struck down.”99 The Court went on: 
The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or 
suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this 
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that Congress intended for RFRA to “restore.” As such, it is not clear that 
RFRA adds anything to the discussion. 
94  319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
95  321 U.S. 573 (1944). 
96 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106–07. 
97  17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
98 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113. 
99 Id.
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resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the 
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close 
its doors to all those who do not have a full purse.100
Even though the city’s licensing tax contained no exemption for religious 
organizations, the First Amendment mandated that one being given. 
A year later, Follett confirmed the constitutional necessity of tax 
exemptions for religious organizations. The Court again concluded that the 
First Amendment required exemption from a municipality’s flat licensing 
tax for the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious solicitors. 
The exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties 
guaranteed by the First Amendments is as obnoxious as the imposition 
of a censorship or a previous restraint. For, to repeat, “the power to tax 
the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its 
enjoyment.”101
Justice Murphy drove home the need for religious tax exemptions in his 
concurrence. “It is wise to remember,” he said, “that the taxing and 
licensing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of 
unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and 
destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.”102
The Follett Court rejected the characterization of a tax exemption for 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses as a subsidy. “This does not mean that religious 
undertakings must be subsidized,” said the Court.103 Rather, our holding is a 
recognition that religious organizations cannot “be required to pay a tax for 
the exercise of that which the First Amendment has made a high 
constitutional privilege.”104
The lion’s share of the Supreme Court’s consideration of religious tax 
exemptions after Murdock and Follett addressed whether such exemptions 
were permissible under the Establishment Clause, not whether the 
exemptions were in fact required by the Constitution. The cases arose when 
taxpayers sued, arguing that a state’s provision of tax exemptions to 
religious institutions ran afoul of the Establishment Clause by 
impermissibly endorsing religion. Nonetheless, the cases bear directly on 
our question of whether such religious tax exemptions are a subsidy or a 
constitutionally compelled recognition of the autonomy of religious 
100 Id. at 112 (citations omitted). 
101  Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at 
112) (citations omitted). 
102 Id. at 579 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
103 Id. at 577. 
104 Id. at 578. 
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institutions.
The Court again grounded the constitutionality of religious tax 
exemptions in separation concerns in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of 
New York.105 In Walz, an owner of real property in Richmond County, New 
York sued the New York City Tax Commission arguing that “granting 
property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties 
used solely for religious worship” violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.106 The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the 
exemption. 
Writing for the Walz majority, Chief Justice Burger explained that the 
goal of religious tax exemptions is “to avoid excessive entanglement”107 of 
government and religious institutions, thereby “prevent[ing] the kind of 
involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of 
churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”108 The New York 
property tax exemption, said Burger, springs from a constitutionally-based 
concern with “the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies.”109 Such 
bodies “should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the 
hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes.”110
Grants of exemption historically reflect the concern of authors of 
constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent in the 
imposition of property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable and 
balanced attempt to guard against those dangers . . . . Elimination of 
exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by 
giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax 
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in 
the train of those legal processes . . . . The exemption creates only a 
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less 
than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between 
church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired 
separation insulating each from the other.111
Despite the Walz Court’s forceful language about church, state separation, it 
did not hold that religious tax exemptions were constitutionally required, as 
it had in Murdock and Follett. Rather, the Court held that the New York tax 
exemption was a constitutionally “permissible state accommodation” of 
105  397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
106 Id. at 666. 
107 Id. at 670. 
108 Id. at 669–70. 
109 Id. at 672. 
110 Id.
111 Id. at 673–74, 676. 
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religious institutions.112 The First Amendment permits states to exempt 
religious institutions, but it does not require it. 
Noteworthy for our purposes, the Court refused to categorize religious 
tax exemptions as government subsidies. A “subsidy would be a 
relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental 
grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative 
relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards, but
that is not this case.”113 New York did not exempt religious organizations 
from property taxes to further its own program of social welfare, i.e., 
religious organizations provide a “public benefit” that the state 
“considers . . . as beneficial and stabilizing influence[s] in community 
life.”114 Instead, New York “is simply sparing the exercise of religion from 
the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions.”115
Paulsen explains: 
Walz expressly disclaimed a “public benefit” theory for justifying tax 
exemption of religious organizations. The rationale upon which the 
Court upheld the New York statute in Walz was that tax-exemption 
seeks to protect free exercise, foster diversity, and minimize 
governmental interference.116
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, is more direct. He pushes aside “those 
who . . . argue that exemptions are the equivalent of governmental subsidy 
of churches . . . . Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are 
qualitatively different.”117
Walz, thus, dismisses the idea that religious tax exemptions are a 
government subsidy. Though the case does not require religious tax 
exemptions, it solidly roots the constitutionality of such exemptions in 
concerns about the autonomy of religious institutions. 
The Court reached a seemingly opposite result in Texas Monthly v. 
Bullock.118 The case involved a Texas sales tax statute that applied to all 
publications except “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a 
religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching 
of the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious 
112 Id. at 673. 
113 Id. at 675 (emphasis added). 
114 Id. at 673. 
115 Id.
116  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection 
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 363–64 (1986). 
117 Walz, 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
118  489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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faith.”119 The narrow statutory exemption aimed squarely at religious 
publications. Texas Monthly, a secular magazine publisher, challenged the 
religious tax exemption as violative of the Establishment Clause. A 
plurality of the Court agreed. But even in striking the exemption down, the 
plurality expressed worry over “enmesh[ing] the operations of church and 
state.”120 Not just that the Texas may be impermissibly favoring religion, 
but that the state may be meddling with religious institutions in a way that 
treads on their autonomy. 
The plurality said that Texas’ sales tax exemption “lacks sufficient 
breadth to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.”121 Such a narrow 
exemption inevitably entangles the state in religion. The exemption, the 
plurality said: 
appears, on its face, to produce greater state entanglement with religion 
than the denial of an exemption. As Justice Stevens has noted: “There 
exists an overriding interest in keeping the government—whether it be 
the legislature or the courts—out of the business of evaluating the 
relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that governmental 
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as 
favoring one religion over another is an important risk the 
Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.” The prospect of 
inconsistent treatment and government embroilment in controversies 
over religious doctrine seems especially baleful where, as in the case 
of Texas’ sales tax exemption, a statute requires that public officials 
determine whether some message or activity is consistent with “the 
teaching of the faith.”122
The plurality discussed and cited approvingly Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence from Walz.123 The tax exemption in Walz applied to “real or 
personal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable 
purposes,” not just religious purposes.124 Justice Harlan linked the breadth 
of the exemption in Walz with entanglement concerns, concluding that there 
is less entanglement danger when a tax exemption is broad. 
119 Id. at 5 (citations and quotations omitted). 
120 Id. at 21. 
121 Id. at 14. 
122 Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)) (citations omitted). In raising these concerns, the Court cited to the line of cases where it 
recognized the Establishment Clause’s protection of religious autonomy—cases like Jones v. Wolf, 443 
U.S. 595 (1979), Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), and 
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
123 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 13. 
124  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 666–67 (1970). 
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In the instant case noninvolvement is further assured by the neutrality 
and breadth of the exemption. In the context of an exemption so 
sweeping as the one before us here its administration need not entangle 
government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious, for 
any organization—although not religious in a customary sense—would 
qualify under the pervasive rubric of a group dedicated to the moral 
and cultural improvement of men. Obviously the more discriminating 
and complicated the basis of classification for an exemption—even a 
neutral one—the greater the potential for state involvement in 
evaluating the character of the organizations.125
In other words, the religious tax exemption in Walz furthered church, 
state separation by avoiding entangling the State of New York in the affairs 
of religious institutions. Whereas the religious tax exemption in Texas
Monthly did just the opposite. It was so narrowly drawn that it necessarily 
required the State of Texas to troll through religious publications to 
determine whether or not they in fact “promulgat[ed] the teaching of the 
faith.”126 It increased church, state entanglement rather than minimized it. 
The plurality, throughout its opinion, labeled Texas’ tax exemption as 
a “subsidy.” But it is, as Professor Zelinsky has observed, “invoked in a 
reflexive fashion.”127 Of course, in a colloquial sense, religious tax 
exemptions provide “pecuniary aid” to religious organizations. That does 
not mean the plurality believed that Texas’ exemption was a “subsidy” in 
the technical, legal sense. Texas did not provide the exemption because it 
viewed the religious periodicals as promoting the state’s own program or 
message. Rather, as the lower court found, Texas passed the exemption 
with the “purpose of preserving separation between church and state.”128
The plurality disagreed that the exemption accomplished this purpose but it 
did not dispute that it was the state’s objective. 
Moreover, if the plurality truly believed Texas’ exemption was a 
subsidy, then that should have been the end of the case. It flatly violates the 
Establishment Clause for the government to subsidize a religious 
organization for the purpose of sending a religious message. The very fact 
that the Court did not treat the case as open-and-shut means it did not 
believe Texas was paying religious publications to send the state’s own 
message. Yes, the Court concluded that the exemption was a “blatant 
endorsement of religion.”129 But it went on to consider the “degree of state 
125 Id. at 698–99 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
126 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14. 
127  Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 836. 
128 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 6. 
129 Id. at 21. 
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entanglement in religious affairs.”130 That would not have been necessary if 
the exemption was a true subsidy. 
So the Texas Monthly court continued to root the constitutionality of 
tax exemptions in separation of church and state concerns. Specifically, 
whether the exemption impermissibly entangled the government with 
religious matters. The Court concluded that Texas’ narrow tax exemption 
for religious publications resulted in forbidden entanglement. It required the 
state to wade into whether magazines and books were sufficiently religious 
to fall within the state’s tax exemption. The Court labeled the exemption as 
a subsidy, but did so only reflexively. It did not in fact treat Texas’ 
exemption as a true subsidy. 
The Court’s earlier decision in Mueller v. Allen131 contrasts with Texas
Monthly, showing that a broader tax help, that avoids meddling with the 
autonomy of religious institutions, passes constitutional muster. In Mueller,
the Court sustained against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota income 
tax deduction for parents’ expenses for their children’s elementary and 
secondary educations. Unlike the narrow tax exemption the Court struck 
down in Texas Monthly, Minnesota’s tax deduction covered “educational 
expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attend[ed] 
public schools and those whose children attend[ed] non-sectarian private 
schools or sectarian private schools.”132 So it “permit[ted] all parents—
whether their children attend[ed] public school or private—to deduct their 
children’s educational expenses.”133 For example, the deduction was 
available if a parent living in one public school district paid tuition to send 
her child to a public school in another district. Or if a public school parent 
pays for “[c]ertain summer school tuition.”134 Expenses incurred by parents 
sending their children to private religious school were also included, but 
those expenses were only one small part of the program. 
The breadth of Minnesota’s deduction differentiates it from Texas’ 
exemption. The Court said, “[A] program, like [Minnesota’s], that neutrally 
provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily 
subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”135 The Court again 
tied the constitutionality to entanglement concerns. The broad nature of the 
deduction led the Court to adjudge, “[W]e have no difficulty in concluding 
that the Minnesota statute does not ‘excessively entangle’ the state in 
130 Id. at 20 n.9. 
131  463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
132 Id. at 397 (emphasis in original). 
133 Id. at 398 (emphasis in original). 
134 Id. at 391 n.2. 
135 Id. at 398–99. 
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religion.”136 Any decisions the state has to make about whether particular 
expenses qualify for the deduction, the Court said, “do . . . not differ 
substantially from making the types of decisions approved in earlier 
opinions of this Court.”137 Minnesota had no need to sift through parental 
expenses to see if the private schools where they were spending money 
were religious enough to qualify for the deduction. The deduction applied 
across the board to all educational expenses—whether incurred at religious 
or nonreligious institutions. 
The income tax exemption provided by the IRS to religious 
organizations under Section 501(c)(3) falls firmly on the Mueller v. Allen
side of the line.138 Like Minnesota’s tax deduction, the 501(c)(3) exemption 
is broadly defined. It applies to any “[c]orporations, and any community 
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational 
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”139
Section 501(c)(3), unlike the tax exemption in Texas Monthly, does not 
direct a benefit “exclusively to religious organizations.”140 Rather, the 
exemption applies to the complete spectrum of nonprofit corporations. 
The breadth of the 501(c)(3) exemption means the IRS does not need 
to scrutinize how religious an organization is for it to qualify for tax-exempt 
status. Most religious organizations serve more than one purpose. For 
instance, a private religious school, like Wheaton College in Illinois,141
operates both for a religious purpose and for an educational purpose. 
Likewise, a Christian humanitarian aid organization, like World Vision 
International,142 operates both for a religious purpose and for a charitable 
purpose. In each instance, either purpose is sufficient to qualify the 
religious organization for 501(c)(3) status. Just how religious these 
organizations really are is not determinative of whether they meet the 
criteria for tax-exempt status. 
And even when the IRS does consider whether an organization has a 
religious purpose, its inquiry is limited. The Internal Revenue Manual, the 
internal protocols for IRS personnel, gives examination guidelines for 
religious activities. The guidelines say, “Under the First Amendment, the 
136 Id. at 403. 
137 Id.
138 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
139  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015). 
140  Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989). 
141 See WHEATON COLLEGE, www.wheaton.edu (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
142  See WORLD VISION INT’L, www.worldvision.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
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IRS can’t consider the content or sources of a doctrine alleged to constitute 
a particular religion. The IRS also can’t evaluate the content of a doctrine 
an organization claims is religious.”143 In other words, the IRS must give 
deference to what the organization calls religious. It cannot stick its nose 
into the religious organization’s operations and beliefs to sniff out if they 
are religious enough to qualify for an exemption. 
Moreover, the most likely organizations to apply for 501(c)(3) status 
solely on the ground of having a religious purpose—meaning they do not 
also fall under some other category like educational or charitable—are 
churches. And churches are special. Most organizations seeking tax-exempt 
status are required to apply to the IRS for an advance determination that 
they meet the requirements of Section 501(c)(3). But churches do not.144 A 
church may simply hold itself out as tax exempt and receive the benefits of 
that status without applying for advance recognition from the IRS.145 So 
there is no determination made by the IRS at all. That means there cannot 
possibly be any entanglement with religion when it comes to churches and 
tax-exempt status. 
Even beyond religious organizations, applications for 501(c)(3) status 
just generally receive little scrutiny from the IRS. During fiscal year 2014, 
for example, the IRS disapproved only 67 applications out of the 100,032 
total 501(c)(3) applications submitted.146 A report from the Stanford 
University Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society concluded, “Nearly 
every application on which a decision is rendered is approved.”147 “It is 
hardly an exaggeration,” said the report, “to say that when it comes to 
oversight of the application process to become a public charity, nearly 
anything goes.”148 Whatever allegations can be made about the process of 
religious organizations applying for 501(c)(3), it is certainly not that the 
process impermissibly entangles the IRS with religion. The process, if 
anything, furthers the separation concerns that drive the recognition of a 
religious tax exemption in the first place. 
143  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, Part 4.76.6 (Oct. 24, 2014), 
www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-076-006.html.
144 See 26 U.S.C. § 508(c) (2015). 
145 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 
(2015), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf. 
146 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 57 (2014), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.
pdf.
147  ROB REICH, LACY DORN & STEFANIE SUTTON, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT
STATUS BY THE IRS, STANFORD UNIV. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AND CIV. SOC’Y 4 (2009), 
http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Anything-Goes-PACS-11-09.pdf.
148 Id.
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At first blush, the Supreme Court’s follow up to Texas Monthly—the 
decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization149—
appears to undermine the argument that the IRS is constitutionally 
compelled to exempt religious organizations from income taxation. In the 
case, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries sold religious merchandise in California 
and claimed a constitutional right to a sales tax exemption. A unanimous 
Supreme Court rejected this claim. “The Free Exercise Clause,” said the 
Court, “does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption from its 
generally applicable sales and use tax.”150 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries could 
avoid any alleged burden on its free exercise rights simply by not selling 
cups, books, tapes, and other swag in the State of California. 
Swaggart is thus a limited opinion. It involved the imposition of 
unrelated business income tax on the sale of merchandise by a religious 
organization. The Court explained, “[I]t is a tax on the privilege of making 
retail sales of tangible personal property and on the storage, use, or other 
consumption of tangible personal property in California.”151 Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries fell under California’s sales and use tax because it sold 
merchandise in the state, not just because it operated in the state. It was not 
the religious services, the preaching, or the hymn singing that California 
taxed. It was the side business of selling merchandise. Like anyone else 
selling things in the state, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries had to pay a tax on 
these sales. 
This fact makes California’s sales and use tax distinct from something 
like the federal income tax under consideration in this article. A religious 
organization falls under an income tax merely by existing and carrying on 
its operations. Like any other organization or business, religious 
organizations need revenue to survive. For religious organizations, revenue 
typically comes from donations, tithes, and grants. To the extent this 
revenue exceeds the organization’s expenses—the money spent on items 
like wages, office supplies, janitorial services, and toilet paper—the 
organization has income. God willing, every religious organization has 
income or else it will not last long. In a for-profit business, that difference 
between revenue and expenses represents taxable income. The for-profit 
business must pay federal corporate income tax at rate of fifteen to thirty-
nine percent depending on exactly how much taxable income it has. And, 
but for the existence of religious tax exemptions at the federal and state 
levels, religious organizations would have taxable income too. So a 
religious organization can avoid a sales and use tax, but, absent some type 
149 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
150 Id. at 392 (emphasis in original). 
151 Id. at 389–90 (emphasis added). 
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of exemption, not an income tax. 
Just as significantly, a sales tax and an income tax differ as to the 
centrality of the activity they tax. A sales and use tax is aimed at a 
secondary part of a religious organization’s enterprise—selling swag, food, 
or other items. Those sales are subsidiary to the organization’s primary 
activity of ministering. As the Swaggart Court said, “[T]he collection and 
payment of the generally applicable [sales] tax in this case imposes no 
constitutionally significant burden on appellant’s religious practices or 
beliefs.”152 In contrast, an income tax is aimed at the heart of what religious 
organizations do. It taxes religious organizations simply for existing and 
engaging in religious activities. The Swaggart Court recognized this kind of 
tax “might effectively choke off an adherent’s religious practices.”153
California itself recognizes these distinctions. It imposes a sales and 
use tax on religious organizations because the state understands this does 
not raise “[t]he sorts of government entanglement that [the Supreme Court 
Justices] have found to violate the Establishment Clause.”154 Such a tax is 
not, as the Court said, “invasive.”155 Religious organizations can just choose 
not to sell things in the state. But California still maintains income tax 
exemptions for religious and educational organizations because an income 
tax is “invasive.”156 A church or other religious organization is subject to 
the tax simply by existing and ministering within the state’s borders. An 
income tax cannot be avoided. It opens the possibility of the state taxing a 
religious organization out of existence. 
The Court in Swaggart, just as it did in the prior religious tax 
exemption cases, considered whether the California sales tax resulted in 
“administrative entanglement.”157 The Court concluded that it did not. 
Most significantly, the imposition of the sales and use tax without an 
exemption for appellant does not require the State to inquire into the 
religious content of the items sold or the religious motivation for 
selling or purchasing the items, because the materials are subject to the 
tax regardless of content or motive. From the State’s point of view, the 
critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but whether 
there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular 
152 Id. at 392. 
153 Id.
154 Id. at 395–96. 
155 Id. at 396. 
156 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23701d (West 2015). 
157 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 394. 
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determination.158
The sales and use tax applied to all commerce in the state, whether religious 
or nonreligious. The kind of narrow, religion-specific exemption that 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries requested would have ensnared the state in 
religion just like the religious tax exemption in Texas Monthly.
2.  The Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Case Law 
So what should we make of the Court’s seemingly erratic treatment of 
religious tax exemptions? At bottom, that whatever the apparent 
discrepancies, the Court has a steadfast concern for the protection of 
religious autonomy. At least four observations can be made. 
First, the Court has consistently recognized that taxing religious 
organizations is fraught with constitutional hazards. Way back in Murdock,
the Court cautioned about the “destructive effect” of allowing the 
government to tax religion.159 In Follett, the Court said, “[T]he taxing and 
licensing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of 
unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and 
destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.”160 In Walz, the 
Court warned of the “latent dangers inherent in the imposition of property 
taxes” on religious organizations.161 It said that a religious tax exemption 
“constitute[d] a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those 
dangers.”162 In Texas Monthly, the Court noted that taxing religious 
organizations poses a “danger of stamping out missionary work” and risks 
becoming “a covert attempt to curtail religious activity.”163 In Mueller, the 
Court said that the relationship between taxes, tax benefits, and religious 
organizations raises “evils against which the Establishment Clause was 
designed to protect.”164 “[G]overnment involvement in religious life,” said 
the Court, “is apt to lead to strife.”165 The persistent drumbeat of the Court 
has been that taxing religious organizations jeopardizes their 
constitutionally protected autonomy. 
Second, the constitutionality of religious tax exemptions hinges on 
their impact on the autonomy of religious organizations. The First 
158 Id. at 396. 
159  Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943). 
160  Follett v. City of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
161  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). 
162 Id.
163  Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 24 (1989). 
164  Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399. (1983). 
165 Id. at 399–400 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973)) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
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Amendment compelled an exemption for the Jehovah’s Witnesses from the 
flat taxes in Murdock and Follett because the taxes acted as a “restraint on 
the free exercise of religion.”166 The religious exemption from New York’s 
property tax in Walz was constitutional because it served to accommodate 
“the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies.”167 The narrow religious 
exemption from the sales tax in Texas Monthly was unconstitutional 
because of “the degree of state entanglement in religious affairs.”168 It 
required state officials “to subject the content of religious publications 
to . . . exacting scrutiny” in a way that “enmesh[ed] the operations of church 
and state.”169 The tax deduction in Mueller was upheld because it did “not 
‘excessively entangle’ the State in religion.”170 Nothing in the statute 
required state to intrude on the affairs of private religious schools. Taxing 
the ancillary merchandise sales of religious organizations raised no 
Establishment Clause problems in Jimmy Swaggart because the Court 
found “no excessive entanglement between government and religion.”171
The state stayed out of the business religious organizations—it was “not 
require[d] . . . to inquire into the religious content of the items sold or the 
religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items.”172 In each of these 
cases, the root of what made the tax exemptions constitutional or 
unconstitutional was the repercussions on the self-rule of religious 
organizations. 
Third, whether a tax impermissibly encroaches on the autonomy of 
religious organizations depends on what activity the government chooses to 
tax. When the government taxes a collateral part of what religious 
organizations do, like the sale of t-shirts, stickers, and mugs as in Jimmy 
Swaggart, it does not raise the same concerns about religious autonomy as 
when the government taxes religious organizations’ central operations and 
ministry, like the tax on the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ “missionary evangelism” 
in Murdock.
In Murdock, the city’s flat tax transgressed the separation of church 
and state because the tax fell squarely on the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious 
activity—their door-to-door evangelism. The Court specifically rejected the 
characterization of such evangelism as “merely incidental and collateral to 
166  Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943). 
167 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672. 
168 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20 n.9. 
169 Id. at 20 nn.9 & 21. 
170 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403. 
171  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 397 (1990). 
172 Id. at 396. 
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their main object” as a religious organization.173 Rather, the Court deemed 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ canvassing to be core religious exercise. 
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of 
missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses. It has 
been a potent force in various religious movements down through the 
years. This form of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by 
various religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to 
thousands upon thousands of homes and seek through personal 
visitations to win adherents to their faith. It is more than preaching; it 
is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of 
both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of 
religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First 
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the 
pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and 
conventional exercises of religion.174
Allowing the city to tax the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ door-to-door evangelism 
threatened to shut their religious exercise down altogether. 
Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its 
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its 
maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form 
of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not 
have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and 
honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can 
deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part 
of the vital power of the press which has survived from the 
Reformation.175
That stands in contrast to the sales tax in Jimmy Swaggart. California’s 
tax in that case fell “on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible 
personal property.”176 Unlike the city’s tax on the Jehovah’s Witness door-
to-door evangelism in Murdock, California taxed the ministry’s sale of 
merchandise, not its religious activities. “[T]he sales and use tax,” the Court 
said, “is not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information, ideas, or 
beliefs.”177
California taxed only an ancillary part of Jimmy Swaggart’s 
activities—the selling of items like “t-shirts with JSM logo, mugs, bowls, 
173  Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111–12 (1943). 
174 Id. at 108–09. 
175 Id. at 112. 
176 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389–90. 
177 Id. at 389. 
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plates, replicas of crown of thorns, ark of the covenant, Roman coin, 
candlesticks, Bible stand, pen and pencil sets, prints of religious scenes, bud 
vase, and communion cups.”178 “There [was] no danger,” said the Court, 
“that appellant’s religious activity [was] being singled out for special and 
burdensome treatment.”179 The “tax merely decrease[d] the amount of 
money appellant ha[d] to spend.”180
The Court specifically distinguished the flat tax imposed on the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Murdock. “[T]he burden of a flat tax could render 
itinerant evangelism crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll 
or tribute which is exacted town by town.”181 “But,” said the Court, “we 
face no such situation in this case.”182 Any intrusion on religious autonomy 
affected by the sales and use tax was minimal at best. So a tax imposed on a 
collateral part of a religious organization’s undertakings does not raise the 
same concerns regarding church, state separation as a tax aimed at its 
necessary day-to-day operations. 
Fourth, and finally, the Court has often used the “subsidy” label in a 
conclusory fashion, giving no real consideration to whether the government 
is doling out tax exemptions to religious organizations for the purpose of 
advancing its own message and agenda. Recall that initially, the Court in 
Murdock, Follett, and Walz eschewed the “subsidy” label altogether. “Tax 
exemptions and general subsidies . . . are qualitatively different . . . . Tax 
exemptions, accordingly, constitute mere passive state involvement with 
religion and not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright 
governmental subsidy.”183 Things changed in Texas Monthly. The Court 
deemed Texas’ sales tax exemption for religious publications a “subsidy.” 
Yet the Court readily acknowledged that the state had the “purpose of 
preserving separation between church and state,” and not a purpose of 
furthering its own favored message.184 The exemption, thus, could not be 
said to meet the technical definition of a subsidy. 
The upshot is that the religious tax exemption in Section 501(c)(3) 
seems much more likely to be about protecting the autonomy of religious 
organizations than giving them a subsidy. The federal income tax has peak 
potential for a “destructive effect” on religious organizations. Religious 
organizations, like any business, depend on income as their lifeblood. 
178 Id. at 383. 
179 Id. at 378–79. 
180 Id. at 391. 
181 Id. at 392 (quotations omitted). 
182 Id.
183  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 690–91 (1970). 
184  Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 6 (1989). 
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Earning income is part and parcel of their everyday operations. Religious 
organizations obviously cannot avoid earning money if they are to have any 
longevity. Were the federal government given a free hand to tax the income 
of the religious organizations, it could tax them out of existence. It is hard 
to conceive of a greater intrusion on religious autonomy. 
A.  Tax Policy Supports Treating Religious Tax Exemptions as 
Constitutionally Required Rather than as Subsidies 
The Court’s tendency to characterize religious tax exemptions as 
subsidies is rooted in what is called tax expenditure analysis. The central 
premise of this analysis is that tax provisions fall into one of two categories: 
one, normative provisions, which define the base of the tax; or two, 
expenditure provisions, which deviate from the base in a manner equivalent 
to direct government expenditures.185 A normative provision defines the tax 
base by spelling out the assets or income streams subject to taxation.186 The 
tax base of a property tax, for instance, is a list of the real property—
whether commercial, residential, or industrial—subject to the tax. An 
expenditure provision is any deviation from the defined tax base.187 So any 
deduction, exclusion, or exemption is a deviation from the base and 
therefore a tax expenditure, meaning it is the equivalent of a subsidy from 
the public fisc. It is as if the government made the decision to spend money 
directly in favor of whatever entity is the beneficiary of the deduction, 
exclusion, or exemption. 
Consider Walz again. The base of the New York tax could be 
characterized as all real property in the state. The exemption of religious 
properties was a deviation from that base.188 So, under tax expenditure 
analysis, the exemption would be an expenditure—a decision by the state to 
subsidize religious organization. Or consider Texas Monthly. The base of 
the Texas tax was the sale of any periodical in the state. The exemption of 
religious periodicals was a deviation from that base.189 So, using tax 
expenditure analysis, the exemption was an expenditure—it constituted a 
subsidy of religious organizations publishing religious periodicals. 
The rub with tax expenditure analysis is that it provides no rule of 
thumb for when to classify a particular tax provision as normative or as an 
185 See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971,
994 (1999). 
186 See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural 
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–71 (1993). 
187 See id.
188 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 666–67. 
189 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5–7. 
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expenditure. When is the government defining the base of a tax and when is 
it deviating from that base to subsidize a particular entity? Nothing compels 
the classification of a tax provision as one or the other. Yet that 
classification is essential for knowing when it is fair to treat a deduction, 
exclusion, or exemption as a government subsidy as opposed to merely 
defining the contours of a tax.190
With Walz, the religious tax exemption could just as easily be 
classified as normative as it could be as an expenditure. The base of the 
New York property tax could be viewed as “personal residences and 
business property.”191 The exemption for religious or charitable properties 
then would be part of defining the tax base rather than an expenditure. If 
religious properties are not part of the base to begin with, then their 
exemption from the tax is not a deviation. And thus, under tax expenditure 
analysis, the exemption is not an expenditure and cannot be called a 
subsidy.
The Court has reflexively classified many religious tax exemptions as 
expenditure provisions. But nothing in tax expenditure analysis compels 
this conclusion. In fact, the Court’s knee-jerk reaction to religious tax 
exemptions ignores the reality that much tax exemption is best understood 
as base defining. Take for example my own state of Florida. Florida is 
financed largely by a six percent sales tax. The state imposes no personal 
income tax. It is not compelling to characterize the state’s failure to tax 
personal income as a “subsidy” of citizen’s income. Rather, the state’s 
taxing power excludes personal income as a matter of tax base selection. 
The same can be said of religious tax exemptions. In Murdock and 
Follett, Justice Murphy noted that it was unconvincing to consider the 
Court’s exemption of the Jehovah’s Witnesses from the city’s licensing tax 
as a subsidy, since the city could not tax them without running afoul of the 
First Amendment.192 If the Constitution mandates the exclusion of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses from the tax base to begin with, it is not a “subsidy” to 
refrain from taxing them. Rather, it is the implementation of a 
constitutionally-required tax base. 
As pointed out above, the Court’s concern about church and state 
separation has permeated its consideration of religious tax exemptions. That 
concern suggests that exemptions for religious organizations are normative 
rather than expenditures. The government is defining its tax base in 
recognition of the autonomy of religious organizations. It is not making a 
190 See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 809–10. 
191  Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1291 (1969). 
192 See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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decision to subsidize their message or mission. 
McCulloch v. Maryland193 provides a parallel. The State of Maryland 
“impose[d] a tax on all banks or branches thereof, in the state of Maryland, 
not chartered by the legislature.”194 The state’s tax base seemingly included 
the bank established by the federal government, since it was not chartered 
by the state legislature. As such, the Court’s decision that the Constitution 
required the exemption of the federal bank from the tax could be viewed as 
a subsidy. The exemption was a deviation from the defined tax base. But 
that’s not how the Court viewed its decision. Rather, the Court saw it as the 
implementation of a constitutionally required tax base. Federalism—the 
very structure of government established by the Constitution—placed the 
federal bank outside of Maryland’s tax power.195 The state could not 
include the bank within its tax base to begin with, so the exemption of the 
federal bank could not be considered a subsidy. 
The religious exemption from the federal income tax is similar. Much 
like federalism placed the federal bank beyond the taxing power of the State 
of Maryland, the Establishment Clause—and the ensuing concerns about 
religious autonomy—places religious organizations beyond the federal 
government’s power to tax. The religious exemption in Section 501(c)(3) 
implements the constitutionally required tax base. It does not constitute an 
expenditure or subsidy in favor of religion.196
The Court cannot blithely label a religious tax exemption as a 
subsidy—a deviation from the tax base—unless there is agreement as to 
normative tax base to begin with. Nothing in tax expenditure analysis 
mandates that a religious tax exemption be denominated an expenditure 
provision rather than a normative provision. The Court’s consistent concern 
for religious autonomy suggests religious tax exemptions are a proper 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty of religious institutions. As such, 
religious tax exemptions are not subsidies, because they implement, rather 
than deviate from, the normative tax base. 
193  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
194 Id. at 317. 
195 See id. at 428. 
196  The Supreme Court itself classified a tax credit for tuition dollars spent at private religious 
schools as normative in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2010). In 
Winn, the Court dismissed on standing grounds a taxpayer challenge under the Establishment Clause to a 
tax credit given for individuals who contributed money to a student tuition organization that in turn 
provided scholarships for students to attend private schools, including religious ones. The taxpayer 
plaintiffs argued that the tax credit was akin to a subsidy or governmental expenditure, which the 
taxpayers would have standing to challenge under the Establishment Clause. The Court disagreed, 
explaining that there is a difference between when the government spends money and “[w]hen the 
government declines to impose a tax.” Id. The credit was part of defining the base of the tax rather than 
an expenditure. 
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B.  The History of Religious Tax Exemptions Reinforces Their 
Constitutional Necessity 
Treating religious tax exemptions as constitutionally required explains 
the thoughts and actions of the founding generation. As Professor Zelinsky 
has aptly said, “Much ink has been spilled addressing the apparent paradox 
that the founding generation proclaimed the separation of church and state 
while simultaneously confirming and extending tax exemption for 
churches.”197 The states ratified the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, in 1791.198 “Religious 
tax exemptions were not an issue in the petitions calling for the Bill of 
Rights, in the pertinent congressional debates, or in the debates preceding 
ratification by the states.”199 Yet that was not because they did not exist or 
could not be foreseen. In fact, religious tax exemptions “were widespread 
during colonial days.”200 Rather, it is more likely that the founders simply 
viewed religious tax exemptions as consistent with separation. Or, more 
strongly put, that such exemptions actually furthered separation rather than 
contradicted it. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia’s story is illustrative of how the 
founders viewed the interplay of religious tax exemptions and church, state 
separation.201 Virginia established the Anglican Church as the state church 
in 1619.202 And it continued as the state church until 1799, when the 
Virginia General Assembly passed the Act to Repeal Certain Acts, and to 
Declare the Construction of the Bill of Rights and Constitution, Concerning 
Religion.203 Although Thomas Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom from 1786 is often celebrated as the end to Virginia’s official state 
church, the bill “did not expressly disestablish the Anglican Church (or its 
successor the Protestant Episcopal Church).”204 “The church could, under 
the letter of [Jefferson’s bill], continue to enjoy the imprimatur of the state 
197  Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 839. 
198 See Bill of Rights FAQs, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/BOR-
faqs.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
199  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 682 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
200 Id.
201  The Supreme Court has repeatedly said, “The Commonwealth’s efforts to separate church 
and state provided the direct antecedents of the First Amendment.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 437 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 33–38 (1947) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting).
202 See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA TO 1877, at 58 (Edwin S. Gaustad 
& Mark A. Noll eds., 3d ed. 2003). 
203 Walz, 397 U.S. at 683 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
204  Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 88 (2009). 
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(just not its financial support), as well as the state’s preferential 
treatment.”205 The government could even continue to have a “hand in 
clerical appointments or the regulation of the liturgy.”206 It was not until 
thirteen years later, in 1799, that the Commonwealth officially 
disestablished the Anglican Church.207
The 1799 Act affirmed that the Virginia Bill of Rights had “excepted 
from the powers given to the government, the power of reviving any species 
of ecclesiastical or church government . . . by referring the subject of 
religion to conscience.”208 And going directly to disestablishment, the Act 
pronounced that the repealed measures that had “bestowed property upon 
the [Anglican Church],” had “asserted a legislative right to establish any 
religious sect,” and had “incorporated religious sects,” were “inconsistent 
with the principles of the constitution, and of religious freedom, and 
manifestly tends to the reestablishment of a national church.”209 Yet just 
one year after the passage of this Act, Virginia re-enacted a measure 
exempting from taxation property belonging to “any . . . college, houses for 
divine worship, or seminary of learning.”210 This exemption dated at least 
from 1777 and had been reaffirmed immediately before and after 
ratification of the First Amendment.211 Virginians, thus, did not view the 
exemption for “houses of divine worship” as somehow re-establishing 
religion. Religious tax exemption and separation could at least co-exist. 
The best explanation of this tension between the founding generation 
simultaneously propounding separationism and religious exemptions is that 
they thought of exemptions as furthering church, state separation. It is only 
when religious tax exemptions are thought of as subsidies that the founding 
generation’s actions seem illogical. How could they have pushed for the 
disestablishment of churches and at the same time pushed for the 
government to subsidize them? They could not and, in fact, did not. Their 
actions show that they understood religious exemptions as a proper 
recognition of religious autonomy and therefore, compatible with the 
separation of church and state. 
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See Michael V. Hernandez, A Flawed Foundation: Christianity’s Loss of Preeminent 
Influence on American Law, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 657–58 (2004). 
208 Walz, 397 U.S. at 683 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 2 Va. Statutes at Large of 1792–
1806 (Shepherd) 149).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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III. THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF BOB JONES UNIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court in Bob Jones treated the religious exemption in 
Section 501(c)(3) as being constitutionally compelled, rather than as a 
matter of government subsidy. Had the Bob Jones Court believed the 
exemption was a subsidy, then the Court need not have considered whether 
the “IRS construction of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) violate[d] [the schools’] free 
exercise rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”212 As 
Professor Eugene Volokh has observed, “The government need not 
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights.”213 A subsidy is a matter of 
government largess. If the IRS determines that subsidizing racially 
discriminatory private schools is contrary to the policies it seeks to 
promote, then it can simply choose no longer to subsidize those schools. 
But that is not what the Court did. The Court acknowledged that the 
“[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the 
operation of private religious schools.”214 It carefully set churches and other 
religious institutions to one side, recognizing the heightened concerns about 
religious autonomy.215 “We deal here only with religious schools —not with 
churches or other purely religious institutions.”216 Instead, the Court held 
that the government’s interest in eradicating race discrimination in 
education was “so compelling as to . . . substantially outweigh[] whatever 
burden denial of tax benefits places on [the schools’] exercise of their 
religious beliefs.”217 According to the Court, “The interests [in religious 
autonomy] asserted by petitioners [Bob Jones University and Goldsboro 
Christian Schools] cannot be accommodated with that compelling 
governmental interest.”218
It was the government’s unique and compelling “interest . . . in 
denying public support to racial discrimination in education” that justified 
the intrusion on religious autonomy.219 “[R]acially discriminatory schools 
exert a pervasive influence on the entire educational process,” said the 
Court, “outweighing any public benefit that they might otherwise 
provide.”220 The Court has recognized no similar interest when it comes to 
212  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983). 
213  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1919, 1924 (2006). 
214 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603–04. 
215 See id. at 604 n.29. 
216 Id. (emphasis in original). 
217 Id. at 603–04. 
218 Id. at 604. 
219 Id. at 604 n.29. 
220 Id.
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private religious schools adhering to the view that marriage is the union of 
one man and one woman. 
A.  The Run Up to Bob Jones
The controversy in Bob Jones is rooted in the efforts of civil rights 
groups to curb the growth of racially discriminatory private schools. The 
U.S. Supreme Court declared racial segregation in public schools to be 
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education221 in 1954. In the 
aftermath of Brown, thousands of white children in the South fled the newly 
integrated public schools.222 They sought refuge in private schools where 
they could continue to receive a segregated education. “In some 
communities, the white student body,” according to Professor Olatunde 
Johnson, “moved en masse to a new private school, taking the indicia of the 
old schools, such as the school colors, symbols, and mascots.”223 Many 
Southern state governments even encouraged the creation of these 
segregated, private schools by “enacting legislation mandating or allowing 
the closing of public schools to resist desegregation or providing state tax 
credits and tuition grants to students attending private schools.”224
Ten years after Brown, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.225 Title VI of the Act specifically prohibited racial segregation and 
discrimination in schools that received “federal financial assistance.”226
Congress premised Title VI on the belief that federal dollars should not 
subsidize segregation in public schools.227 But rather than putting an end to 
the segregated education that dominated the South, Title VI resulted in even 
greater growth of private, segregated schools.228 One hundred and sixty-
eight private schools opened in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina between 1964 and 1967. Most were 
openly segregationist and operated by secular organizations. White citizens’ 
councils, for instance, operated more than 150 all-white “segregation 
academies” in the South, serving more than 9,000 students.229
As time went by, more and more of these segregated, private schools 
were opened by Evangelical Christian churches. Indeed, by 1970, Christian 
221  Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
222 See Johnson, supra note 36, at 4. 
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2015). 
226 Id.
227 See Johnson, supra note 36, at 4. 
228 See id. at 4–5. 
229 Id.
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private schools outnumbered the secular schools.230 Many claimed that 
“Christian schools and segregation academies [were] almost 
synonymous.”231
When Congress passed Title VI, the Internal Revenue Service put a 
freeze on “applications for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the [Internal 
Revenue] Code filed by private schools apparently found to be operated on 
a segregated basis.”232 The freeze was supposed to give the IRS time to 
consider whether tax exemptions qualified as “federal financial assistance” 
under Title VI. The freeze lasted two years. At the conclusion, the IRS 
issued a revenue ruling determining that private, segregated schools could 
only be denied tax-exempt status where “[s]tate action for constitutional 
purposes” was found.233 Because government assistance—whether tax 
exemptions or otherwise—does not generally convert private action into 
“state action,” the revenue ruling effectively shielded the schools from 
losing their tax exemptions.234 Indeed, the very same day the IRS issued its 
ruling, it approved tax-exempt status for more than forty segregated, private 
schools.235
The IRS’s ruling did not sit well with civil rights groups. The Lawyers 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCR) orchestrated a lawsuit, 
ultimately known as Green v. Connally, “to enjoin the Secretary of the 
Treasury from granting tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi 
which discriminate[d] against Negroes in admissions.”236 LCCR argued that 
the IRS’s ruling violated constitutional and statutory prohibitions on 
government aid to racially discriminatory organizations.237 A three-judge 
district court agreed and preliminarily enjoined the IRS “from issuing 
230 Id.
231  Joseph Crespino, Civil Rights and the Religious Right, in RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING
AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 96 (Bruce Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008). 
232  Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970). 
233  The IRS’s ruling provided as follows: 
The Service stated that its general conclusion is that exemption will be denied and contributions 
will not be deductible if the operation of the school is on a segregated basis and its involvement 
with the state or political subdivision is such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a 
violation of the laws of the United States. 
Where, however, the school is private and does not have such degree of involvement with the 
political subdivision as has been determined by the courts to constitute State action for 
constitutional purposes, rulings will be issued holding the school exempt and the contributions to it 
deductible assuming that all other requirements of the statute are met. 
Press Release, Internal Revenue Service (Aug. 2, 1967), 1967 CCH STANDARD FED. TAX REP. ¶ 6734. 
234 See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 
(1982).
235 See Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. at 1131. 
236 Id. at 1129. 
237 See id. at 1129–30. 
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further ruling letters under sections 170(c) and 501(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code to private schools in Mississippi.”238
In response to the ruling, the IRS concluded that it could “no longer 
legally justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code] to private schools which practice racial discrimination.”239
At the same time, the IRS announced that it would no longer “treat gifts to 
such schools as charitable deductions for income tax purposes [under § 
170].”240 A few months later, the IRS formally notified private schools of 
its change in policy.241
The Green court eventually issued its opinion on the merits, approving 
the IRS’s new construction of its code.242 The three-judge district court held 
that “racially discriminatory private schools were not entitled to exemption 
under § 501(c)(3) and that donors were not entitled to deductions for 
contributions to such schools under § 170.”243 The court reasoned that 
segregated private schools were not “charitable” within the meaning of the 
law because they operated contrary to federal public policy against racial 
discrimination. The court, thus, permanently enjoined the Commissioner of 
the Internal Revenue from approving tax-exempt status for any school in 
Mississippi that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination.244
A group of parents supporting tax exemptions for segregated schools 
appealed the case directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court summarily 
affirmed the district court’s decision.245
A few months later, the IRS issued a revenue ruling formalizing its 
new policy on the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private 
schools.246 Private schools that discriminated on the basis of admission in 
the administration of educational and other school-administered programs 
could not be considered charitable within the meaning of sections 501(c)(3) 
or 170(a).247 Both provisions incorporated common-law notions that 
charitable trusts could not be illegal or contrary to public policy. While 
private discrimination in schools was not illegal, “federal policy against 
238 Id. at 1131. 
239  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 578 (1983) (quoting I.R.S. News Release 
(July 10, 1970), reprinted in 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6,790). 
240 Id.
241 See id.
242 See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Coit v. 
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
243 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 578; see also Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1155.
244 See Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1164. 
245 See Coit, 404 U.S. at 997.
246 See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971–2 C.B. 230. 
247 See id.
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racial discrimination is well-settled,” as reflected in judicial 
pronouncements such as Brown and Title VI.248
B.  The IRS Denies Tax-Exempt Status to Bob Jones University and 
Goldsboro Christian Schools 
Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools were among 
the private schools the IRS notified following the preliminary injunction in 
Green v. Kennedy that their racially discriminatory practices jeopardized 
their tax-exempt status.249 Goldsboro flatly denied admission to black 
students, while Bob Jones admitted black students but prohibited interracial 
dating and marriage. Both schools genuinely believed that the Bible forbade 
“racial intermixing.”250 When the schools failed to comply with the IRS’s 
demands, the IRS revoked their tax-exempt status. 
That presented a problem for the schools. Being tax exempt under 
Section 501(c)(3) allowed the schools to avoid federal income taxation, 
meaning the difference between their revenues, like donations and tuition, 
and their expenses, like wages and maintenance costs, were not treated as 
taxable income. Now the schools had to pay tax on this income. Moreover, 
donors to Bob Jones and Goldsboro could no longer deduct donations to the 
schools from their taxes. That obviously made donating to the schools less 
attractive.251 The schools sued in federal court, advancing two primary 
arguments: first, the IRS exceeded its authority when it interpreted Section 
501(c)(3) to exclude racially discriminatory schools and, second, the 
revocation of tax exemption intruded on their religious autonomy protected 
by the religious clauses of the First Amendment.252
The Court was not sympathetic to either of the schools’ arguments. 
The IRS’s interpretation of Section 501(c)(3), and its subsequent 
application to the schools, comported with historic notions of what 
constituted a charity. The Court found that “§ 170 and § 501(c)(3) 
embrace[d] the common law ‘charity’ concept.”253 That concept, according 
to the Court, included “the requirement, long recognized in the law of 
trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate 
established public policy.”254 One such “established public policy” in the 
United States was “that racial discrimination in education violates deeply 
248 Id.
249 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574, 581–82 (1983). 
250 See id. at 604 n.30. 
251 See id. at 579–84. 
252 See id. at 591–92, 602–04. 
253 Id. at 585. 
254 Id. at 591. 
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and widely accepted views of elementary justice.”255 “Over the past quarter 
of a century, every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of 
Congress and Executive Orders,” said the Court, “attest a firm national 
policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public 
education.”256 Were the IRS to give tax-exempt status to Bob Jones and 
Goldsboro, it would plainly run afoul of this well established public policy. 
“It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax 
exemption,” said the Court, “to grant the benefit of tax-exempt status to 
racially discriminatory educational entities.”257
The Court acknowledged that the denial of the schools’ tax-exempt 
status had a “substantial impact” on their religious autonomy, but said that 
the government “may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing 
that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”258
“[T]he Government,” said the Court, “has a fundamental, overriding interest 
in eradicating racial discrimination in education.”259 Whatever the intrusion 
on the schools’ religious autonomy, it was “substantially outweigh[ed]” by 
the government’s interest in rooting out race discrimination in education.260
The Court, thus, upheld the denial of tax-exempt status to both schools. 
C.  The Limited Reach of the Court’s Decision 
In reaching its conclusion in Bob Jones, the Court acknowledged the 
sensitivity with which public policy matters are imbued. 
We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that 
determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters 
with serious implications for the institutions affected; a declaration that 
a given institution is not “charitable” should be made only where there 
can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental 
public policy.261
The Court underscored the limited circumstances in which the IRS and the 
courts may even consider the effect of public policy. “We emphasize,” said 
the Court, “that these sensitive determinations should be made only where 
there is no doubt that the organization’s activities violate fundamental 
255 Id. at 592. 
256 Id. at 593. 
257 Id. at 595. 
258 Id. at 603–04 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982)). 
259 Id. at 604. 
260 Id.
261 Id. at 592. 
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public policy.”262 The Court expressly left open “whether an organization 
providing a public benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of § 
501(c)(3) could nevertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its 
activities violated a law or public policy.”263
The Bob Jones Court itself limited its ruling to “religious schools” and 
only when “the governmental interest is in denying public support to racial 
discrimination in education.”264 It is not at all clear that the Court intended 
to create a free-floating public policy doctrine, whereby the IRS can deny 
tax-exempt status anytime it determines an organization’s actions or beliefs 
violate public policy. Professor Douglas Kmiec points out, “[T]here have 
been very few true extensions of the Bob Jones public policy limitation 
outside the racial discrimination context.”265
Only a handful of court decisions have done more than mention the 
public policy limitation from Bob Jones in passing.266 Of those, only two 
merit comment. First, in Church of Scientology v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue,267 the United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s revocation of 
income tax exemption of the Church of Scientology. But the organization’s 
activities were clearly illegal. The Church “impede[d] the IRS in 
performing its duty to determine and collect taxes from petitioner and other 
Scientology churches.”268 The activities alleged were egregious—
”petitioner filed false tax returns, burglarized IRS offices, stole IRS 
documents, and harassed, delayed, and obstructed IRS agents who tried to 
audit the Church’s records.”269
Second, in Synanon Church v. United States,270 a federal district court 
in the District of Columbia ruled that Synanon failed to establish 
entitlement to exemption under Section 501(c)(3). Synanon was allegedly 
founded to rehabilitate drug addicts and to engage in related research and 
public education. However, the organization regularly “advocate[d] terror 
262 Id. at 598. 
263 Id. at 596 n.21. 
264 Id. at 604 n.29. 
265  Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns 
Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 103, 109 
(Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008). 
266 See Jerry Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 403 
(2005) (“Judicial decisions following Bob Jones add little to the doctrine espoused by the Supreme 
Court. Few decisions have done more than mention the public policy doctrine in passing.”). 
267  83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). 
268 Id. at 503. 
269 Id. at 505. 
270  579 F. Supp. 967 (1984), aff’d, 820 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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and violence.”271 The district court found “repeated attacks and threats of 
violence committed by Synanon members against those perceived as 
enemies of the organization.”272 But the court ultimately based its denial of 
the tax exemption on the organization’s “systematic destruction of tapes 
and alteration of records . . . contemporaneous with an IRS audit.”273
Despite Synanon’s illegal behavior, the court declined to rely on the public 
policy doctrine from Bob Jones as the basis for decision. The court said, “[It 
was] concerned with the proper application of the Bob Jones analysis if it 
could be said that Synanon conferred some arguable public benefit—drug 
rehabilitation, for example—while simultaneously maintaining a policy of 
violence and terror.”274
Outside the courts, Bob Jones has been administratively extended to 
include racial discrimination in any 501(c)(3) context. For instance, the IRS 
considered a tax exemption for a charitable trust that provided “for the 
benefit and relief of worth and deserving white persons.”275 The trust 
furnished goods and services to needy, Caucasian citizens over the age of 
sixty.276 The IRS said that the Bob Jones decision “leaves little doubt” that 
racial discrimination, “whether in an educational context or otherwise,”
violates public policy in such a fundamental way as to justify revocation of 
an entity’s tax-exempt status.277 The trust’s racially restrictive provision, 
according to the IRS, “foster[ed] racial discrimination” and, therefore, was 
contrary to “clearly defined federal public policy against racial 
discrimination.”278
In a private letter ruling in 1988, the IRS likewise said, “Although 
applying on its face only to race discrimination in education, the 
implication of the Bob Jones decision extends to any organization claiming 
exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) and to activity violating a clear 
public policy.”279 The letter ruling concerned a privately administered trust 
that restricted beneficiaries to “worthy and deserving white persons.”280 The 
IRS held that the trust did not qualify for tax exemption under Section 
501(c)(3) since it “aggravate[d] the burdens placed on those who have 
traditionally been the subject of discrimination and thereby fosters racial 
271 Id. at 971. 
272 Id.
273 Id. at 974. 
274 Id. at 979. 
275  I.R.S. Gen. Counsel Mem. 39,792, at 5 (June 30, 1989), 1989 WL 592760, at *1. 
276 See id. at 4. 
277 Id.
278 Id. at 5. 
279  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-001 (Nov. 30, 1988). 
280 Id.
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discrimination.”281 Consequently, the trust’s activities were “contrary to a 
clearly defined public policy” against racial discrimination.282
But the IRS has refused to push Bob Jones beyond the topic of race. 
For example, when a support program for teaching the literature and history 
of the Bible was challenged as violating the Establishment Clause,283 the 
IRS determined that “the objection was without merit.”284 It cautioned 
against “finding Bob Jones like violations of public policy premised on 
other individual rights.”285 The IRS noted that it could “think of no more 
fundamental federal public policy than the Bill of Rights.”286 More recently, 
the IRS refused to revoke an exemption on public policy grounds for an 
over accumulation of income. The IRS commented that “[c]urrently the sole 
basis for revocation of exemption on public policy grounds is engaging in 
racial discrimination.”287
The reluctance of the courts and the IRS to expand Bob Jones beyond 
racial discrimination makes sense. Professor Johnny Rex Buckles has 
rightly said that an expansion of “[t]he public policy doctrine presents a 
thorny array of other concerns,”288 including most basically: what defines 
the contours of public policy; what makes public policy fundamental; what 
role, if any, does state law play in defining public policy; and how many 
acts would demonstrate a disregard of public policy? These questions have 
no clear answers. 
All these considerations point to what Professor Olatunde Johnson 
observed about Bob Jones. The case is “too extraordinary to matter 
much.”289 It sits alongside Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of 
Education290 and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,291 where the 
Court undertook extraordinary measures to remedy the evil of race 
discrimination. The cases are important victories for civil rights but they do 
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989), 1989 WL 592766. 
284  Kmiec, supra note 265, at 109. 
285 Id.
286  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,800, at 10 (Oct. 25, 1989), 1989 WL 592766, at *4. 
287  Internal Revenue Service, Field Service Advice Memorandum, 1997 FSA LEXIS 478, at *11 
(Apr. 23, 1997). 
288  Buckles, supra note 266, at 398. 
289  Johnson, supra note 36, at 29; see also James A. Davids, Enforcing a Traditional Moral 
Code Does Not Trigger a Religious Institution’s Loss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 435 
(2012) (“[A]fter reviewing the context of the Bob Jones case . . . it is little wonder [that] neither the 
Internal Revenue Service . . . nor the Supreme Court has extended the sanction beyond private 
educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of race.”). 
290  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
291  379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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not establish broad rules that can be applied outside the context of 
eradicating racism. In short, Bob Jones and its ilk are, as Professor Michael 
Paulsen has said, “sui generis.”292
IV. BOB JONES DOES NOT JUSTIFY STRIPPING RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
OF THEIR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS BECAUSE OF THEIR VIEWS ON MARRIAGE
The Bob Jones Court recognized the importance of protecting the 
autonomy of religious organizations but ruled that the government’s interest 
in eradicating race discrimination in education was so “fundamental” and 
“overriding” to justify abrogating the wall between church and state.293
When it comes to same-sex marriage, there is no similarly “fundamental” 
and “overriding” interest that warrants ignoring the protections for religion 
provided by the Establishment Clause. 
The “fundamental” and “overriding” interest in Bob Jones was specific 
as to education.294 Nine times the majority emphasized that “racial 
discrimination in education violates a fundamental public policy.”295 The 
federal government’s condemnation of racial discrimination in education 
“was unmistakably clear.”296 “Over the past quarter of a century, every 
pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive 
Orders,” said the Court, “attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial 
292  Paulsen, supra note 42, at 694. 
293  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). 
294 Id. (“[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial 
discrimination in education.”) (emphasis added). 
295 Id. at 594 (emphasis added); see also id. at 579 (“Based on the national policy to discourage 
racial discrimination in education, the IRS ruled that a private school not having a racially 
nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within the common law concepts reflected in 
sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code.”) (emphasis added); id. at 582 (Bob Jones University’s “racial 
policies violated the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial 
discrimination and, more specifically, the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination 
in education, public or private.”) (emphasis added); id. at 592 (“But there can no longer be any doubt 
that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary 
justice.”) (emphasis added); id. at 593 (“An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of 
Education establishes beyond doubt this Court’s view that racial discrimination in education violates a 
most fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals.”) (emphasis added); id. at 595 
(“Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools’ policies, and however sincere the rationale 
may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy.”) (emphasis added); id. at 604 
(“the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in 
education”) (emphasis added); id. at 584 n.23 (“if any national policy is sufficiently fundamental to 
constitute such an overriding limitation on the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is 
the policy against racial discrimination in education”) (emphasis added); id. at 604 n.29 (“We deal here 
only with religious schools—not with churches or other purely religious institutions; here, the 
governmental interest is in denying public support to racial discrimination in education.”) (emphasis 
added).
296 Id. at 598. 
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segregation and discrimination in public education.”297 No similar 
unanimity exists within the three branches of the federal government with 
regard to sexual orientation discrimination in education. 
The educational context of Bob Jones shows that the private religious 
schools arose, particularly in the South, as a way to avoid desegregation. 
Jim Crow laws formalized school segregation in 1877.298 That segregation 
continued until 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education,299 which mandated racially-integrated schools. Brown put an 
end to the formal, legal segregation that had lasted 77 years. In response, as 
explained above, a slew of private religious schools cropped up as an end 
run of racial integration. Many of these private schools had state support. In 
Bob Jones, the Supreme Court closed the loophole. It finally put the kibosh 
on attempts to dodge the racial integration required by Brown.
Gays and lesbians have faced no similar history of discrimination in 
education. Private religious schools, like Wheaton College300 and Biola 
University,301 did not spring up to provide avenues for students to avoid 
gays and lesbians. Indeed, the educational environment for gays and 
lesbians is mostly favorable. Many colleges and universities undertake 
“special recruiting efforts for gay students.”302 Organizations, like Campus 
Pride, hold college fairs across the country catering to gays and lesbians.303
“Ivy League schools are often represented” at these fairs, according to the
New York Times.304 Schools like Duke University and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology specifically ask applicants about sexual orientation 
on their admissions application.305 University officials refer to gays as “the 
new blue-chip recruits.”306 That hardly seems the kind of treatment calling 
for the extraordinary measures employed by the Court in Bob Jones.
No laws have been passed barring schools from discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
does not prohibit “harassment or discrimination based upon sexual 
297 Id. at 593. 
298 See William M. Wiecek & Judy L. Hamilton, Beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Confronting Structural Racism in the Workplace, 74 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2014) (discussing “the 
comprehensive racial regime that we know as segregation or Jim Crow, which lasted from the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877 until it began to crumble in the Second Reconstruction after 1954”). 
299  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
300 See WHEATON COLLEGE, www.wheaton.edu (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
301 See BIOLA UNIVERSITY, www.biola.edu (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
302 See Schwartz, supra note 43. 
303 See CAMPUS PRIDE, www.campuspride.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
304  Schwartz, supra note 43; see also Shafrir, supra note 43. 
305 See Jaschik, supra note 43. 
306 See Lamb, supra note 43. 
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orientation.”307 The U.S. Department of Education suggested last year that 
perhaps “Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition extends to claims of 
discrimination based on gender identity or failure to conform to 
stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity.”308 But Congress has 
taken no action to expand the reach of Title IX. 
Outside the context of education, the federal government has still been 
largely silent on sexual orientation discrimination. Presidents Clinton and 
Obama signed executive orders prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination by the federal government and its contractors.309 But federal 
law otherwise does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Congress 
has yet to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which 
would ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment 
nationwide. ENDA has been introduced in every Congress since 1994, but 
has yet to pass both houses. The Senate, but not the House, passed a version 
of ENDA in November 2013. The Senate included a broad exemption for 
religious organizations, including private religious schools.310
Obergefell did nothing to change the calculus. The Obergefell court
largely rooted its decision in the fundamental right to marry. It 
acknowledged that “the right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of 
the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from 
that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”311 But it 
did not hold that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification. Obergefell is strictly about marriage, not about prohibiting 
discrimination more broadly against gays and lesbians. 
The current state of federal law does not seem to provide the kind of 
“fundamental” and “overriding” interest sufficient to set aside the 
Constitution’s mandate of church, state separation. In Bob Jones, there was 
a “firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in 
public education.”312 The Court had no “doubt that racial discrimination in 
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary 
justice.”313 The federal government had engaged in “consistent” efforts to 
eliminate racial discrimination in education—even by military force. There 
307  Tyrrell v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 792 F. Supp. 2d 601, 622-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
308  Emma Margolin, Transgender Students Protected Under Title IX, DOE Says, MSNBC (Apr. 
30, 2014, 4:09 PM), www.msnbc.com/msnbc/transgender-students-protected-under-title-ix.
309 See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 2, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 
Fed. Reg. 30097 (May 28, 1998); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014). 
310 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employ 
ment_Non-Discrimination_Act#113th_Congress (last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
311  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
312  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983). 
313 Id. at 592. 
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is no counterpart with sexual orientation discrimination.314
Of course that could change. Just this past summer, the EEOC 
interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to forbid sexual 
orientation discrimination on the job as a form of “sex” discrimination.315
The EEOC’s views on the scope of Title VII are merely persuasive. Indeed, 
no court is required to follow the agency. Nonetheless, the EEOC’s decision 
points to a possible shift in federal nondiscrimination law. If, and when, that 
shift occurs, the argument for a “fundamental” and “overriding” interest 
perhaps becomes a bit easier. But until that day comes, the autonomy of 
religious organizations, and the ensuing tax exemption under Section 
501(c)(3), seem safe. 
CONCLUSION
The calls from scholars and commentators to strip private religious 
schools of their tax-exempt status in the wake of Obergefell are off base. 
These calls have uniformly assumed that a tax exemption is a government 
subsidy. But when the federal government exempts religious organizations 
from paying income tax, it is not choosing to back religion. Rather, the 
government is recognizing that the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment mandates a separation of church and state. It imposes a 
structural restraint that places religious organizations beyond the taxing 
power of the federal government. 
Bob Jones is an anomaly. Eradicating race discrimination in education 
is the only public policy the Court has held so “fundamental” and 
“overriding” to abrogate the autonomy of religious schools. The factual 
context of Bob Jones is so unique and extraordinary that, as Professor 
James Davids observed, “it is little wonder why neither the Internal 
Revenue Service . . . nor the Supreme Court has extended the sanction 
beyond private educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of 
race.”316
No similar context exists for sexual orientation discrimination in 
education. If anything, gays and lesbians are sought after and welcomed by 
the most prestigious and powerful education institutions in the country. 
314 See id. at 594. 
315 See Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 16, 2015), www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/sexual_orientation/eeoc-lgbt-title-vii-decision.authchec
kdam.pdf.
316  James A. Davids, Enforcing a Traditional Moral Code Does Not Trigger a Religious 
Institution’s Loss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 435 (2012); see also id. at 455 
(“[G]iven the extraordinary history and context of racial segregation in education, the likelihood of the 
Court finding a similar compelling interest in areas other than racial discrimination is remote.”). 
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People of faith did not establish private religious schools to evade gays and 
lesbians. The Establishment Clause protects the autonomy of these schools. 
It precludes the government from being handed the power to tax them out 
of existence. To paraphrase Professor Zelinksy, in the final analysis, tax 
exemption does not subsidize these religious schools, it leaves them 
alone.317
317 See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 8. 
